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by the courts. In Clinard v. City of Winston Salem23 the North Caro-
lina court answered the question in the negative. There appears to
have been only one other case2 4 involving the inclusion in a general
zoning plan of one provision for segregation. The court there also
held the ordinance unconstitutional. While this question has never
been directly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States it
would appear, in view of the widespread application of the holding
in the Buchanan case, that the court would merely declare the segrega-
tion provision unconstitutional while leaving the remainder of the
ordinance substantially intact. It is submitted that this would be a
fundamentally sound result.
The author was unable to discover cases in the remainder of the
seventeen southern states having segregation by law, and it is, there-
fore, assumed that if the question has arisen in those states it has
never been adjudicated by a court of last resort.
In view of the foregoing discussion it is now manifest that all ordi-
nances contemplating segregation of the races as to places of abode
are unconstitutional. Such legislation exceeds the proper exercise
of the police power and in its purpose is clearly violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Any theory of promotion of the public peace and welfare by pre-
vention of racial conflicts is overridden by the serious infringement
of property interests. The courts contend that regardless of what
may be argued in support of segregation legislation in other contexts
and its application in particular to education, it will not apply to
legislation of this variety wherein persons are clearly deprived, with-
out due process of law, of their constitutionally guaranteed privilege
of disposing of property.
JAmES S. KOSTAS
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MOTION PICTURES-
THE "MIRACLE" DECISION
In Burstyn v. Wilson,' the Supreme Court of the United States for
the first time was presented squarely with the question: Are motion
pictures within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, secures to any form of speech
or the press? The question was answered in the affirmative and a
-3217 N. C. 119, 6 S.E. 2d 867 (1940).
' Bowen v. City of Atlanta, 159 Ga. 145, 125 S.E. 199 (1924).172 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
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37 year-old anomaly in Constitutional Law-based on an application
of a state constitution-was thereby abandoned. Prior to this decision,
freedom of expression in newspapers, books, and magazines was pro-
tected from abridgement, but it was not protected in motion pictures.
The source of this inconsistency was a case decided during the
early history of the film industry, Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission of Ohio,2 in which an Ohio statute was attacked as being
violative of the Ohio constitutional guaranty of a free press.3 The
statute, providing for a board of censors to approve for showing only
such films "as are of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless
character," was held valid on the basis that motion pictures were
not a part of the press, and therefore, were not subject to constitu-
tional protection.4 In view of the fact that at the time of this decision,
"talking pictures" were eleven years in the future, it is not hard to
rationalize the holding, the foundation of which rested heavily on
the belief that "entertainment" did not warrant the protection ex-
tended to speech and the press.5 With the advent of the sound track,
and the subsequent development of the film industry, the holding
made less sense, but has remained the law until 1952, apparently
because of the reluctance of the movie industry to risk the boomerang
effect of a fresh, similar holding.6 Over the years though, changes
in constitutional law developed which strongly indicated that the
judicial attitude toward motion pictures had changed.
In 1925, the Court assumed without discussion that the freedom of
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment is among the fundamental,
personal liberties safeguarded from invasion by state action by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 In 1948, the Court
repudiated the entertainment-information dichotomy, i.e., the belief
that entertainment, as distinguished from information, is not a form
of expression which comes within the protection extended to speech
and the press, when it said:
2236 U.S. 230 (1915).
' Complainant also contended that the statute was an unlawful burden on
interstate commerce, and that it attempted to delegate legislative power to censors.
These arguments were rejected.
4 Complainant had contended in Federal District Court that the statute was a
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, but the District Judge held
that the first eight Amendments to the U.S. Constitution were not restrictions
against state action. Consequently the contention was abandoned at the Supreme
Court level.
"We immediately feel that the argument is wrong or strained which extends
the guaranties of free opinion and speech to the multitudinous shows which are
advertised on the bill-boards of our cities and towns...." McKenna, J., in Mu-
tual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 243 (1915).6This theory was suggested in 49 YALE L. J. 87 (1939).
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one
man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."'
The strongest evidence of a change in the Court's attitude was an-
other 1948 case in which the Court said:
"We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio,
are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First
Amendment."'
This statement, however, had effect only as an indication of the Court's
opinion, because as pointed out by the Court the issue had only a
remote bearing, if any, on the case involved.
The time was ripe for a new challenge of the validity of state
statutes setting up censorship boards to approve films, when the
Board of Regents of New York banned a film entitled "The Miracle"
on the ground that it was "sacrilegious". The action was taken under
a statute providing that the director of the motion picture division
of the education department "shall cause to be promptly examined
every motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and
unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, in-
human, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would
tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefore."
(Italics writer's.) The distributor of "The Miracle" brought an action
to review the determination of the Regents, claiming that the statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment as a prior restraint upon freedom
of speech and the press, and that the term "sacrilegious" was so vague
and indefinite as to offend due process. 10 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division rejecting the
distributor's contentions." On appeal to the Supreme Court it was
held that motion pictures are within the protection of the First Amend-
ment, and that being within that protection, a state may not ban a
film on the basis of a censor's conclusion that it is sacrilegious.
This holding rested on two grounds. In the majority opinion, it
was declared that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
any or all religious views from attack sufficient to justify a prior re-
straint on the press.12 Justice Frankfurther, in a learned concurring
"Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
'United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).11 It was also claimed that the statute was invalid as a violation of the guar-
anty of separate church and state under the Fourteenth Amendment. This con-
tention was not considered by the Supreme Court.
'Joseph Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N.E. 2d 665 (1951).
" The state has no interest in protecting religious views from attack as such,
but this does not preclude an interest if the attack is so vituperative as to cause
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opinion, pointed out the uncertainty of the meaning of the word
sacrilegious, and held that the statute therefore violated due process
for want of an objective standard. It did not sufficiently apprise those
bent on obedience of law of what could reasonably be foreseen to be
found illicit by the law-enforcing authority, and made judicial review
inoperative.
The question which now arises is: How much power is left to the
states to control the showing of motion pictures, either by banning
the whole or by deleting parts of a film before a public showing, or
by subsequent criminal prosecution of those who show a motion pic-
ture deemed to be an abuse of the liberty of the press? That some
measure of control is left after the present case was made clear by
the Court when it said:
"To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion
pictures is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
however, is not the end of our problem. It does not follow that
the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion
picture of every kind at all times and at all places."m
Again in the opinion the Court said:
"Since the term 'sacrilegious' is the sole standard under
attack here, it is not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether
a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly-drawn statute de-
signed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films."'
It is not clear, however, what the limits of permissible control
may be. Court decisions based on past statutes allowing the banning
of motion pictures cannot serve as guides since their validity did not
depend on their being constitutional exercises of the states' limited
control over a free press. Allowable control over media of expression
actual violence. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 815 U.S. 568, 571 (1942),
D was arrested for cursing an officer while on a mission "to preach the true facts
of the Bible." In sustaining the conviction the Court said: "But even if the
activities of the appellant which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious
in character, and therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, they would not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences for
concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute." In Termin-
iello v. City of Chicago, 387 U.S. 1, 83 (1948), D's conviction was reversed be-
cause of a technicality in the record, (See footnote 24 infra) but Justice Jackson
in a dissenting opinion pointed out: "Religious, social and political topics that in
other times or countries have not been open to lawful debate may be freely dis-
cussed here. Because a subject is legally arguable, however, does not mean that
public sentiment will be patient of its advocacy at all times and in all manners.
. . . Hence many speeches, such as that of Terminiello, may be legallypermis-
sible but may nevertheless in some surroundings be a menace to peace and order.
When conditions show the speaker that this is the case, as it did here . .. he
cannot indulge in provocations to violence without being answerable to society."
Burstyn v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 781 (1952).
Id. at 782-783.
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which have been protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
should give some indication as to the extent to which films can be
controlled. But, as pointed out by the Court in the present case:
" . . nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject
to the precise rules governing any other particular method of expres-
sion. Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems."
Unless the "peculiar problems" of expression through motion pic-
tures distinguish them considerably from other forms of expression,
the present decision will radically limit the controls heretofore exer-
cised by the states.'0 The most effective control over motion pictures
has been censorship. Though the constitutional guaranty of free
speech has never been considered absolute, if it approaches the abso-
lute, it does so as to previous restraints, the most common example
of which is censorship. Only a few attempts by the states to exercise
previous restraints over speech or the press have been allowed to
succeed, and the Court has exhibited its feeling of hostility towards
this type of control again and again.'7 There have been, however,
several indications in the language of the cases that previous restraints
would be allowed to stand in certain narrowly limited classes of
speech. In Near v. Minnesota, a case involving an unconstitutional
restraint on newspapers, the Court said:
" . . the protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional
cases. "Vhen a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court would
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.' . . . No one
would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruc-
tion to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications. The security of the community life
may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government.""
This list of exceptions to immunity to prior restraint is not neces-
sarily inclusive; on the other hand cases have not been found to show
conclusively that all of the exceptions, for example, advocacy of the
25 Id. at 781.
" One of the chief arguments interposed for movie censorship is that the
audience is largely made up of adolescents. In answering this argument in the
present case, the Court said that this might figure in determining the permissible
scope of censorship, but was no justification for unbridled censorship. On this
score, CakFrx, F=x_ SPaacH iN =H UNrr=n STATEs 543 (1941), has suggested
that instead of making all photoplays suitable for children, it might be better to
exclude children from certain plays.
' For examples of this hostility, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
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forceful overthrow of the government, would be allowed to stand if
imposed in the form of censorship.19
Of these possible exceptions to the state's inability to impose a
prior restraint, obscenity will probably have the widest application to
motion pictures. Under a properly drawn statute, there is little reason
to believe that films cannot continue to be subject to censorship for
the prevention of obscenity. Such a statute, to succeed, will have to
be narrowly drawn, with limited standards of applicability such as
obscene, lewd, indecent, or other words which have been defined by
the courts and have to some extent the same meaning in the minds
of different people. 20 Catch-all phrases like "of such character as to
be prejudicial to the best interests of the people" will have to be
excluded.21 It has been phrases like this that have made it possible
for censors in the past to ban films when the only objection to them
has been that they espouse social or political beliefs inconsistent with
their own.2 2 Similar wording in statutes controlling constitutionally
protected speech or publications has repeatedly been struck down by
the Court because such broad language vests discretionary power in
the officials administering the statute, allowing them to determine
arbitrarily what can or cannot be spoken or published.23 Once a
"There has long been no doubt, however, that such advocation can be made
a crime. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. United States, 841 U.S. 494 (1950).
The traditional instruction as to what is obscene has been "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall." Regina v. Iicklan, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, 371 (1868). This
test has been replaced in the federal courts by an instruction . . . whether a
publication, taken as a whole, has a libidinous effect." United States v. One Book
Entitled Ulysses, 72 F. 2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1934). Followed by Parmellee v.
United States, 118 F. 2d 729 (D. C. Cir. 1940).Gelling v. Texas, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952) citing the principal case Burstyn
v. Wilson, 72 Sup. Ct. 777 (1952) held a Texas censorship statute containing
this phrase unconstitutional.
"In Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis Blues, 36 COwNELL L. Q. 278,
275-276 (1951) there appears an example, inter alia, of censors in action in Mem-
phis. A motion picture, "Curley," after being passed by at least nine other cen-
sosiboards came to Memphis. The picture was a variation of the "O07 Gang"
comeTies. A pretty school teacher is expected by her pupils to be stern but she
gradually wins the affection of the children by her athletic prowess. The Memphis
censors were unable to approve the picture "with the little Negroes as the South
does not permit Negroes in white schools nor recognize social equality between
the races even in children."
'For example, see Kunz v. New York, 840 U.S. 290 (1950) where a statute
which denied the right to preach on the streets without previously obtaining a
permit from the police commissioner was held invalid, because it was within the
commissioner's discretion whether or not to issue a permit without any appropriate
standards to guide him. Or, see Lovell v. Griffin, 803 U.S. 444 (1938), where a
local ordinance imposing a fine against anyone distributfng pamphlets of any kind
without first obtaining permission from the city manager was held invalid as an
unlawful restraint on a free press. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S1 77 (1949) a
local ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous"
noises on the public street was held not to violate free speech. A similar statute,
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statute is set up, the courts in applying it will have to keep disputes
limited to the narrow confines of the statute.2
4
Because of the disrepute in which the Supreme Court holds pre-
vious restraints on free speech and the press, it is doubtful whether
censorship for any purpose other than to prevent obscenity will be
permissible. The cases generally have restricted prior restraints to
the exercise of nondiscriminatory police powers in regulating phases
of government which indirectly affect a prior restraint on speech or
the press.25 However, many attempts to regulate speech or the press
have failed because they were not limited to specific acts, or because
they allowed the use of discretion in their administration, so that it is
difficult to determine how much restraint a properly drawn statute
might be allowed to impose. Possibly censorship of motion pictures
can be extended to prevent the showing of films which tend to incite
acts of violence .2  If it can, the danger of violence will have to be
substantial, and it might be limited to motion pictures which encourage
an actual breach of the law.2 7
except that sound trucks were allowed if prior permission were obtained from the
chief of police was held invalid since it was within the chief's discretion to deny
a permit. Saia v. New York, 384 U.S. 558 (1948). For a suggested method of
administration of censorship of books and plays-which could as well apply to
photoplays, see CHAFEE, FaEE SPEECH IN THE UNrrEm STATES, 534-540 (1941).
2, A local ordinance provided, "all persons who shall make, aid, countenance,
or assist in making any . . . disturbance, breach of the peace . . . shall be
deemed guilty of disorderly conduct." D was arrested after speaking in an audi-
torium, referring to a crowd outside as filthy scum, and denouncing Zionist Jews,
causing the crowd in their anger to heave bricks through the auditorium windows.
The trial court instructed that breach of the peace consisted, inter alia, of any
misbehavior which violates the public peace by stirring the public to anger, incites
disputes, or brings about a condition of unrest. Held by U.S. Supreme Court,
reversing conviction: As construed, the statute is unconstitutional. It was not
narrowly confined to "fighting words" or some limited type of speech properly
punishable, but included creating unrest, inviting dispute. Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 387 U.S. 1 (1948).
'Milkwagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S.
287 (1941) (injunction against picketing where violence was employed); Breard
v. Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. (1951) (prohibition of door to door solicitation at
private homes without previous consent of the homeowners); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (prohibition of parades without first obtaining permit
which evidence showed would issue as a matter of course); Kovacs v. Cooper, 836
U.S. 77 (1949) (prohibition of the use of sound trucks on the city streets).
"That previous restraint for such purposes would be permissible is implied
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
'In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) a statute as construed by
the state Court of Appeals which prohibited distribution of a magazine principally
made up of news or stories of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust, so massed as
to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against a person was
held by the Supreme Court to be invalid because it was so vague and indefinite
as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting acts within the protection
of the guaranty of free speech and press. In an earlier case, Fox v. Washington,
236 U.S. 273 (1914), the Supreme Court held valid a similar statute on the
ground that it was interpreted by the state court as being confined to acts which
encourage an actual breach of the law.
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Almost as effective as censorship is another method for controlling
offensive speech or publications-subsequent punishment for what is
deemed to be an abuse of the liberty. Punishment, especially if it is
a jail sentence, indirectly imposes a future prior restraint, but the
Court still looks upon it as much less offensive than censorship. -'8
Since punishment is less offensive, any evil which could be censored
out of a picture could certainly, if shown on the screen, serve as a
ground for punishment as an abuse of freedom of the press. Besides
for obscenity or incitements to a breach of the peace, criminal con-
victions have been allowed, inter alia, for hindrance of the war
effort,29 advocacy of the forceful overthrow of the government,30 and
criminal libel.31 In short, a state may punish any utterance or publi-
cation inimical to the public welfare which amounts to a serious abuse
of the freedom of speech or the press.32 But statutes providing pun-
ishment for expression in motion pictures also will now have to pass
constitutional tests.
The calibre of present-day motion pictures is high enough that
few films should fall within the limits of governmental control. The
voluntary industry code now governing American made films cer-
tainly prohibits all that a state can constitutionally prohibit. The
significant point which the present decision wins for the film industry
is what the states cannot prohibit. For example, it will no longer be
legally possible for censors to ban a motion picture that strikes at a
persistent prejudice simply because the censor happens to be of the
group at which the film is aimed. This does not necessarily mean
that complete freedom of expression will follow as an inevitable result
of the decision. The states' limited power to censor or punish, if
abused by over-zealous administrative officials, can still restrain
this freedom, especially if the power is leveled at those who cannot
afford the expense of contesting particular rulings, or of forcing the
issue when possible punishment is threatened. But the decision in
the present case is the necessary first step. How free expression by
motion .pictures is in the future depends largely on the vigilance of
the film industry in demanding that its new rights be observed.
THo MAs P. LEwis
2' Indeed an early case expressed some doubt that the First Amendment per-
tained to anything but previous restraint. "It may well be that the prohibition
of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous re-
straints . . ." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
Sehenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919).
o See note 19 supra.
siBeauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
"Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
